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Abstract
We show FIXP-hardness of computing equilibria in Arrow-Debreu exchange markets under
Leontief utility functions, and Arrow-Debreu markets under linear utility functions and Leontief
production sets, thereby settling these open questions [33]. As corollaries, we obtain FIXP-
hardness for piecewise-linear concave (PLC) utilities and for Arrow-Debreu markets under linear
utility functions and polyhedral production sets. In all cases, as required under FIXP, the set
of instances mapped onto will admit equilibria, i.e., will be “yes” instances. If all instances are
under consideration, then in all cases we prove that the problem of deciding if a given instance
admits an equilibrium is ETR-complete, where ETR is the class Existential Theory of Reals.
As a consequence of the results stated above, and the fact that membership in FIXP has
been established for PLC utilities [17], the entire computational difficulty of Arrow-Debreu
markets under PLC utility functions lies in the Leontief utility subcase. This is perhaps the
most unexpected aspect of our result, since Leontief utilities are meant for the case that goods
are perfect complements, whereas PLC utilities are very general, capturing not only the cases
when goods are complements and substitutes, but also arbitrary combinations of these and much
more.
The main technical part of our result is the following reduction: Given a set S of simultaneous
multivariate polynomial equations in which the variables are constrained to be in a closed
bounded region in the positive orthant, we construct a Leontief exchange market M which has
one good corresponding to each variable in S. We prove that the equilibria ofM, when projected
onto prices of these latter goods, are in one-to-one correspondence with the set of solutions of
the polynomials. This reduction is related to a classic result of Sonnenschein [32, 31].
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1 Introduction
In economics, it is customary to assume that utility functions are non-separable concave, not
only because of their generality but also their nice properties, e.g., decreasing marginal utilities
and convexity (of optimal bundles1). Since computer science assumes a finite precision model of
computation, we restrict attention to piecewise-linear concave (PLC) utility functions2. Extensive
study of special cases of PLC utility functions has led to a deep understanding of computability
of market equilibria, ever since the commencement of this study twelve years ago; see details in
Section 1.1. However, determining the exact complexity of computing equilibria for Arrow-Debreu
markets under PLC utility functions has remained open. A subcase of the latter, which has been
widely used in economic modeling [25], is Leontief utility functions, and its exact complexity has
also remained open, e.g., see [33].
In this paper, we resolve both these problems, by showing them FIXP-hard. Very recently, Yan-
nakakis [36] and Garg et. al. [17] gave proofs of membership in FIXP for Leontief and PLC utility
functions, respectively. However, following the work of Etessami and Yannakakis [16], defining
FIXP and proving FIXP-completeness of Arrow-Debreu markets whose excess demand functions
are algebraic, there has been no progress on giving proofs of FIXP-hardness for other market equilib-
rium problems. Note that the latter result does not establish FIXP-completeness of Arrow-Debreu
markets under any specific class of utility functions3
In this paper, we prove FIXP-hardness for Arrow-Debreu markets under Leontief utility func-
tions. We also show FIXP-hardness for Arrow-Debreu markets under linear utility functions and
Leontief production sets. As corollaries, we obtain FIXP-hardness for PLC utilities and for Arrow-
Debreu markets under linear utility functions and polyhedral production sets (membership in FIXP
for production was also shown in [17]). In all cases, as required under FIXP, the set of instances
mapped onto will admit equilibria, i.e., will be “yes” instances. If all instances are under consid-
eration, then we prove that the problem of deciding if a given instance admits an equilibrium is
ETR-complete, where ETR is the class Existential Theory of Reals.
As a consequence of the results stated above, the entire computational difficulty of Arrow-
Debreu markets under PLC utility functions lies in the Leontief utility subcase. This is perhaps
the most unexpected aspect of our result, since Leontief utilities are meant only for the case that
goods are perfect complements, whereas PLC utilities are very general, capturing not only the cases
when goods are complements and substitutes, but also arbitrary combinations of these and much
more.
Perhaps the most elementary way of stating the main technical part of our result is the following
reduction, which we will denote by R: Given a set S of simultaneous multivariate polynomial
equations in which the variables are constrained to be in a closed bounded region in the positive
orthant, we construct an Arrow-Debreu market with Leontief utilities, sayM, which has one good
corresponding to each variable in S. We prove that the equilibria ofM, when projected onto prices
of these latter goods, are in one-to-one correspondence with the set of solutions of the polynomials.
This reduction, together with the fact that the 3-player Nash equilibrium problem (3-Nash) is
FIXP-complete [16] and that 3-Nash can be reduced to such a system S, yield FIXP-hardness for
the Leontief case.
Reduction R is related to a classic result of Sonnenschein [32, 31] which states that a set
of arbitrary multivariate polynomials can be generated as excess demand functions of an Arrow-
1which is used crucially in fixed point theorems for proving existence of equilibria.
2Clearly, by making the pieces fine enough, we can obtain a good approximation to the original utility functions.
3In the economics literature, there are two parallel streams of results on market equilibria, one assumes being
given an excess demand function and the other a specific class of utility functions.
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Debreu market with concave utilities (in this case, as in ours, simultaneous zeros of the polynomials
correspond to equilibrium prices). This result led to the famous “Anything Goes Theorem” of
Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu [24, 9] which states that very mild restrictions suffice to characterize
excess demand functions of such markets. This theorem had wide ranging consequences to general
equilibrium theory [29].
1.1 Previous results on computability of market equilibria
The first utility functions to be studied were linear. Once polynomial time algorithms were found
for markets under such functions [11, 12, 22, 19, 21, 37, 27, 35, 13] and certain other cases [7, 23, 10,
34, 20], the next question was settling the complexity of Arrow-Debreu markets under separable,
piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utility functions. This problem was shown to be complete [5, 33]
for Papadimitriou’s class PPAD [28]. Also, when all instances are under consideration, the problem
of deciding if a given SPLC market admits an equilibrium was shown to be NP-complete [33].
The notion of SPLC production sets was defined in [18] and Arrow-Debreu markets under such
production sets and linear utility functions were shown to be PPAD-complete.
Previous computability results for Leontief utility functions were the following: In contrast to
our result, Fisher markets under Leontief utilities admit a convex program [15] and hence their
equilibria can be approximated to any required degree in polynomial time [4, 2]. Arrow-Debreu
markets under Leontief utilities were shown to be PPAD-hard [8]; however, since in this case
equilibria are not rational numbers [14], its complexity is not characterize by PPAD (problems
in PPAD have rational solutions). Leontief utilities are a limiting case of constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) utilities [25]. Finding an approximate equilibrium under the latter was also
shown to be PPAD-complete [6].
1.2 Technical contributions
We now describe the difficulties encountered in obtaining reduction R and the ideas needed to
overcome them; this should also help explain why FIXP-hardness of Leontief (and PLC) markets
was a long-standing open problem. For this purpose, it will be instructive to draw a comparison
between reduction R and the reduction from 2-Nash to SPLC markets given in [5]. At the outset,
observe the latter is only dealing with linear functions of variables4 and hence is much easier than
the former.
Both reductions create one market with numerous agents and goods, and the amount of each
good desired by an agent gets determined only after the prices are set. Yet, at the desired prices,
corresponding to solutions to the problem reduced from, the supply of each good need to be exactly
equal to its demand. In the latter reduction, the relatively constrained utility functions give a lot
more “control” on the optimal bundles of agents. Indeed, it is possible to create one large market
with many agents and many goods and still argue how much of each good is consumed by each
agent at equilibrium.
We do not see a way of carrying out similar arguments when all agents have Leontief utility
functions. The key idea that led to our reduction was to create several modular units within the
large market and ensure that each unit would have a very simple and precise interaction with the
rest of the market. Leontief utilities, which seemed hard to manage, in fact enabled this in a very
natural manner as described below. Interestingly enough, in retrospect, we do not see how to create
these units using only SPLC utility functions.
4Since the payoff of the row player from a given strategy is a linear function of the variables denoting the proba-
bilities played by the column player.
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Closed submarket: A closed submarket is a set S of agents satisfying the following: At every
equilibrium of the complete market, the union of initial endowments of all agents in S exactly
equals the union of optimal bundles of all these agents.
Observe that the agents in S will not be sequestered in any way — they are free to choose their
optimal bundles from all the goods available. Yet, we will show that at equilibrium prices, they
will only be exchanging goods among themselves.
These closed submarkets enable us to ensure that variables denoting prices of goods satisfy
specified arithmetic relations. The latter are equality, linear function and product; we show that
these three arithmetic relations suffice to encode any polynomial equation. Under equality, we want
two prices pa and pb to be equal, and under linear functions, we want that pa = Bpb + Cpc + D,
where B,C and D are constants.
Under product, we want that pa = pb · pc. Designing this closed submarket, say M, requires
several ideas, which we now describe. M has an agent i whose initial endowment is one unit of
good a and she desires only good c. We will ensure that the amount of good c leftover, after all
other agents in the submarket consume what they want, is exactly pb, i.e., the price of good b. At
equilibrium, i must consume all the leftover good c, whose total cost is pb · pc. Therefore the price
of her initial endowment, i.e., one unit of good a, must be pb · pc, hence establishing the required
product relation. The tricky part is ensuring that exactly pb amount of good c is leftover, without
knowing what pb will be at equilibrium. This is non-trivial, and this submarket needs to have
several goods and agents in addition to the ones mentioned above.
Once reduction R is established, FIXP-hardness follows from the straightforward observation
that a 3-Nash instance can be encoded via polynomials, where each variable, which represents the
probability of playing a certain strategy, is constrained in the interval [0, 1]. To get ETR-hardness,
we appeal to the result of Schaefer and Sˇtefankovicˇ [30] that checking if a 3-Nash instance has a
solution in a ball of radius half in l∞-norm is ETR-hard; this entails constraining the variables to be
in the interval [0, 1/2]. By Nash’s theorem, in the former case, the market will admit an equilibrium
and in the latter case, it will admit an equilibrium iff the 3-Nash instance has a solution in the ball
of radius half in l∞-norm. Membership in ETR follows by essentially showing a reduction in the
reverse direction: given a Leontief market, we obtain a set of simultaneous multivariate polynomial
equations whose roots capture its equilibria.
Next we briefly describe the classical Arrow-Debreu market model, the problem of 3-Nash and
its relation with the complexity classes FIXP and ETR. Following are a few notations that we will
use in the rest of the paper.
Notations. We mostly follow: capital letters denote matrices of constants, like W ; bold lower case
letters denote vector of variables, like x,y; and calligraphic capital letters denote sets like A,G.
We use [n] To denote the set {1, . . . , n}. Given an n-dimensional vector x and a number r ∈ R, by
x ≤ r, we mean ∀i ∈ [n], xi ≤ r.
2 The Arrow-Debreu Market Model
The Arrow-Debreu (AD) market [1] consists of a set G of divisible goods, a set A of agents and a
set F of firms. Let g denote the number of goods in the market.
The production capabilities of a firm is defined by a convex set of production schedules and
each firm wants to use a (optimal) production schedule that maximizes its profit − money earned
from the production minus the money spent on the raw materials. Firms are owned by agents: Θif
is the profit share of agent i in firm f such that ∀f ∈ F , ∑i∈AΘif = 1. Each agent i has a utility
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function Ui : Rg+ → R+ over bundles, and comes with an initial endowment of goods; Wij is amount
of good j with agent i. Each agent wants to buy a (optimal) bundle of goods that maximizes her
utility to the extent allowed by her earned money – from initial endowment and profit shares in
the firms.
Given prices of goods, if there is an assignment of optimal production schedule to each firm and
optimal affordable bundle to each agent so that there is neither deficiency nor surplus of any good,
then such prices are called market clearing or market equilibrium prices; we note that a zero-priced
good is allowed to be in surplus. The market equilibrium problem is to find such prices when they
exist. In a celebrated result, Arrow and Debreu [1] proved that market equilibrium always exists
under some mild conditions, however the proof is non-constructive and uses heavy machinery of
Kakutani fixed point theorem. We note that an arbitrary market may not admit an equilibrium.
A well studied restriction of Arrow-Debreu model is exchange economy, i.e., markets without
production firms. To work under finite precision it is customary to assume that utility functions
are piecewise-linear concave (PLC) and production sets are polyhedral.
2.1 Piecewise-linear concave (PLC) utility function
As stated earlier, agent i’s utility function is Ui : Rg+ → R+ over bundle of goods. These functions
are said to be piecewise-linear concave (PLC) if at bundle xi = (xi1, . . . , xig) it is given by:
Ui(xi) = min
k
{
∑
j
Ukijxij + T
k
i },
where Ukij ’s and T
k
i ’s are given non-negative rational numbers. Since the agent gets zero utility
when she gets nothing, we have Ui(0) = 0, and therefore at least one T
k
i is zero.
2.1.1 Leontief utility function
The Leontief utility function is a special subclass of PLC, where each good is required in a fixed
proportion. Formally, it is given by:
Ui(xi) = min
j∈G{
xij
Aij
},
where Aij ’s are non-negative numbers. In other words the agent wants good j in Aij proportion.
Clearly, the agent has to spend
∑
j Aijpj amount of money to get one unit of utility. Thus, optimal
bundle satisfies the following condition.
∀j ∈ G, xij = βiAij , where βi =
∑
j∈GWijpj∑
j∈G Aijpj
(1)
2.2 PLC production sets
A firm can produce a set of goods using another set of goods as raw materials, and these two sets
are assumed to be disjoint. Let Pf ∈ Rg be the set of production schedules for firm f , then if it
can produce a bundle xs using a bundle xr then xs−xr ∈ Pf . The set is assumed to be downward
closed, contains the origin 0, no vector is strictly positive (no production out of nothing) and is
polyhedral. We call these PLC production sets.
Let Sf denote the set of goods that can be produced by firm f and Rf be the set of goods it
can use as raw material such that Sf ∩Rf = ∅. A PLC production set of firm f can be described
as follows, where xsfj and x
r
fj denote the amount of good j produced and used respectively.
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Pf =
(xs − xr) ∈ Rg | ∑
j∈Sf
Dkfjx
s
fj ≤
∑
j∈Rf
Ckfjx
r
fj + T
k
f , ∀k;
xs ≥ 0; xsfj = 0, ∀j /∈ Sf ;
xr ≥ 0; xrfj = 0, ∀j /∈ Rf

where Dkfj ’s, C
k
fj ’s and T
k
f ’s are given non-negative rational numbers. Since there is no produc-
tion if no raw material is consumed, it should be the case that for some k, T kf = 0.
2.2.1 Leontief production
The Leontief production is a special subclass of PLC production sets, where a firm f produces a
single good a using a subset of the rest of the goods as raw materials. To produce one unit of a, it
requires Dfj units of good j, i.e.,
xsfa = min
j 6=a
{
xrfj
Dfj
}
.
3 3-player Nash Equilibrium (3-Nash)
In this section we describe 3-player finite games and characterize Nash equilibrium. Given a 3-player
finite game, let the set of strategies of player p ∈ {1, 2, 3} be denoted by Sp. Let S = S1×S2×S3.
W.l.o.g. we assume that |S1| = |S2| = |S3| = ns. Such a game can be represented by ns× ns× ns-
dimensional tensors A1, A2 and A3 representing payoffs of first, second and third player respectively.
If players play s = (s1, s2, s3) ∈ S, then the payoffs are A1(s), A2(s) and A3(s) respectively.
Since players may randomize among their strategies, let ∆p denote the probability distribution
over set Sp, ∀p ∈ {1, 2, 3} (the set of mixed-strategies for player p), and let ∆ = ∆1 × ∆2 × ∆3.
Given a mixed-strategy profile z = (z1, z2, z3) ∈ ∆, let zps denote the probability with which
player p plays strategy s ∈ Sp, and let z−p be the strategy profile of all the players at z except p.
For player p ∈ {1, 2, 3} the total payoff and payoff from strategy s ∈ Sp at z are respectively,
pip(z) =
∑
s∈S
Ap(s)z1s1z2s2z3s3 and pip(s, z−p) =
∑
t∈S−p
Ap(s, t)Πq 6=pzqtq
Definition 3.1 (Nash (1951) [26]) A mixed-strategy profile z ∈ ∆ is a Nash equilibrium (NE)
if no player gains by deviating unilaterally. Formally, ∀p = 1, 2, 3 pip(z) ≥ pip(z′, z−p), ∀z′ ∈ ∆p.
In 1951, John Nash [26] proved existence of an equilibrium in a finite game using Brouwer fixed-
point theorem, which is highly non-constructive. Despite many efforts over the years, no efficient
methods are obtained to compute a NE of finite games. Next we give a characterization of NE
through multivariate polynomials and discuss its complexity.
NE Characterization. It is easy to see that in order to maximize the expected payoff, only best
moves should be played with a non-zero probability; by best moves we mean the moves fetching
maximum payoff. Formally,
∀p ∈ {1, 2, 3}, ∀s ∈ Sp, zps > 0⇒ pip(s, z−p) = δp, where δp = max
s′∈Sp
pip(s
′, z−p) (2)
Assumption. Since scaling all the co-ordinates of Ap’s with a positive number or adding a constant
to them does not change the set of Nash equilibria of the game A = (A1, A2, A3), w.l.o.g. we
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assume that all the co-ordinates of each of Ap are in the interval [0, 1]. Using (2), we can define the
following system of multivariate polynomials, where variables zps’s capture strategies, δp captures
payoff of player p, and βps are slack variables:
FNE(A) :
∀p ∈ {1, 2, 3}, ∑s∈Sp zps = 1
∀p ∈ {1, 2, 3}, s ∈ Sp, pip(s, z−p) + βps = δp and zpsβps = 0
∀p ∈ {1, 2, 3}, s ∈ Sp, 0 ≤ zps ≤ 1, 0 ≤ βps ≤ 1, 0 ≤ δp ≤ 1
(3)
Lemma 3.2 Nash equilibria of A are exactly the solutions of system FNE(A), projected onto z.
Proof : It is easy to check that NE of A gives a solution of FNE(A) using (2); the upper bounds
on variables of FNE(A) holds because all the entries in A are in the interval [0, 1]. Similarly, given
a solution (z,β, δ) of FNE(A), the first condition ensures that z ∈ ∆. The two parts of the second
condition imply that z satisfies (2) and therefore is a NE of game A. 2
Let 3-Nash denote the problem of computing Nash equilibrium of a 3-player game. Next we
describe complexity classes FIXP and ETR, and their relation with 3-Nash.
3.1 The class FIXP
The class FIXP to capture complexity of the exact fixed point problems with algebraic solutions [16].
An instance I of FIXP consists of an algebraic circuit CI defining a function FI : [0, 1]
d → [0, 1]d,
and the problem is to compute a fixed-point of FI . The circuit is a finite representation of function
FI (like a formula), consisting of {max,+, ∗} operations, rational constants, and d inputs and
outputs.
The circuit CI is a sequence of gates g1, . . . , gm, where for i ∈ [d], gi := li is an input variable.
For d < i ≤ d+ r, gi := ci ∈ Q is a rational constant, with numerator and denominator encoded in
binary. For i > d+ r we have gi = gj ◦ gk, where j, k < i and the binary operator ◦ ∈ {max,+, ∗}.
The last d gates are the output gates. Note that the circuit forms a directed acyclic graph (DAG),
when gates are considered as nodes, and there is an edge from gj and gk to gi if gi = gj ◦ gk. Since
circuit CI represents function FI it has to be the case that if we input λ ∈ [0, 1]d to CI then all
the gates are well defined and the circuit outputs CI(λ) = FI(λ) in [0, 1]
d. We note that a circuit
representing a problem in FIXP operates on real numbers.
Reduction requirements: A reduction from problem A to problem B consists of two polynomial-
time computable functions: a function f that maps an instance I of A to an instance f(I) of B,
and another function g that maps a solution y of f(I) to a solution x of I. If xi = gi(y), then
gi(y) = aiyj+bi, for some j, where ai and bi are polynomial-size rational numbers; every coordinate
of x is a linear function of one coordinate of y.
In order to remain faithful to Turing machine computation, Etessami and Yannakakis [16]
defined following three discrete problems on FIXP.
Partial computation FIXPpc: Given an instance I and a positive integer k in unary, compute
the binary representation of some solution, up to the first k bits after the decimal point.
Decision FIXPd: Given an instance I and a rational r return ‘Yes’ if x1 ≥ r for all solutions,
‘No’ if x1 < r for all solutions, and otherwise either answer is fine.
(Strong) Approximation FIXPa: Given an instance I and a rational  > 0 in binary, compute
a vector x that is within (additive)  distance from some solution, i.e., ∃x∗ ∈ Sol(I) such that
|x∗ − x|∞ ≤ .
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Whereas FIXP is a class of, in general, real-valued search problems, whose complexity can be
studied in a real computation model, e.g., [3], note that FIXPpc, FIXPd and FIXPa are classes
of discrete search problems, hence their complexity can be studied in the standard Turing machine
model. This is precisely the reason to define these three classes. The following result was shown in
[16].
Theorem 3.3 [16] Given a 3-player game A = (A1, A2, A3), computing its NE is FIXP-complete.
In particular, the corresponding Decision, (Strong) Approximation, and Partial Computation prob-
lems are complete respectively for FIXPd, FIXPa and FIXPpc.
3.2 Existential Theory of Reals (ETR)
The class ETR was defined to capture the decision problems arising in existential theory of reals
[30]. An instance I of class ETR consists of a sentence of the form,
(∃x1, . . . , xn)φ(x1, . . . , xn),
where φ is a quantifier-free (∧,∨,¬)-Boolean formula over the predicates (sentences) defined by
signature {0, 1,−1,+, ∗, <,≤,=} over variables that take real values. The question is whether the
sentence is true. Following is an example of such an instance.
∃(x1, x2), (x41 + x31x22 − 3x32 + 1 = 0 ∧ x1x2 ≥ 3) ∨ (x42 − 3x1 < 6)
[30] showed that disallowing the operation of < does not change the class ETR. The size of the
problem is n+ size(φ), where n is the number of variables and size(φ) is the minimum number of
signatures needed to represent φ (we refer the readers to [30] for detailed description of ETR, and
its relation with other classes like PSPACE). Schaefer and Sˇtefankovicˇ showed the following result;
the first result on the complexity of a decision version of 3-Nash.
Definition 3.4 (Decision 3-Nash) Decision 3-Nash is the problem of checking if a given 3-player
game A admits a Nash equilibrium z such that z ≤ 0.5, where z is the mixed-strategy profile played.
Theorem 3.5 [30] Decision 3-Nash is ETR-complete.
Note that changing the upper bound on all zps’s from 1 to 0.5 in FNE(A) (3), exactly captures
the NE with z ≤ 0.5. Thus Decision 3-Nash can be reduced to checking if such a system of
polynomial equalities admits a solution. Next we show a construction of Leontief exchange markets
to exactly capture the solutions of a system of multivariate polynomials, similar to that of FNE(A),
at its equilibria.
4 Multivariate Polynomials to Leontief Exchange Market
Consider the following system of m multivariate polynomials on n variables z = (z1, . . . , zn),
F : {fi(z) = 0,∀i ∈ [m]; Lj ≤ zj ≤ Uj , ∀j ∈ [n]}, where Lj , Uj ≥ 0 (4)
The coefficients of fi’s, and the upper and lower bounds Uj ’s and Lj ’s are assumed to be rational
numbers. In this section we show that solutions of F can be captured as equilibrium prices of an
exchange market with Leontief utility functions (see Section 2.1.1 for definition). The problems of
3-Nash and Decision 3-Nash (see Definition 3.4) can be characterized by a set similar to (4) (see
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(3) in Section 3), in turn we obtain FIXP and ETR hardness results for Leontief markets, and in
turn PLC markets, from the corresponding hardness of 3-Nash [16, 30].
Polynomial fi is represented as sum of monomials, and a monomial αz
d1
1 . . . z
dn
n is represented
by tuple (α, d1, ..., dn); here coefficient α is a rational number. LetMfi denote the set of monomials
of fi, and size[fi] =
∑
(α,d)∈Mfi size(α,d), where size(r) for a rational number r is the minimum
number of bits needed to represent its numerator and denominator. Degree of fi is deg(fi) =
max(α,d)∈Mfi
∑
j dj . The size of F , denoted by size[F ], is m + n +
∑
j(size(Uj) + size(Lj)) +∑
i(deg(fi)+size[fi]). Given a system F , next we construct an exchange market in time polynomial
in size[F ], whose equilibria correspond to solutions of F .
4.1 Preprocessing
First we transform system F into a polynomial sized equivalent system that uses only the following
three basic operations on non-negative variables.
(EQ.) za = zb
(LIN.) za = Bzb + Czc +D, where B,C,D ≥ 0
(QD.) za = zb ∗ zc
(5)
Remark 4.1 We note that even though (EQ.) is a special case of (LIN.), we consider it separately
in order to convey the main ideas.
Next we illustrate how to capture fi’s using these basic operations through an example. Consider
a polynomial
4z21z2 + 3z1z2 − z1 − 2 = 0.
First, move all monomials with negative coefficients to the right hand side of the equality, so
that all the coefficients become positive.
4z21z2 + 3z1z2 = z1 + 2
Second, capture every monomials, with degree more than one, using basic operations:
za1 = z
2
1z2 ≡ za2 = z1 ∗ z1, za1 = za2 ∗ z2
zb1 = z1z2 ≡ zb1 = z1 ∗ z2
Third, capture the equality 4za1 + 3zb1 = z1 + 2 using (LIN.) and (EQ.):
4za1 + 3zb1 = z1 + 2 ≡ ze1 = 4za1 + 3zb1 , zf1 = z1 + 2, ze1 = zf1
Finally, combine all of the above to represent fi as follows:
4z21z2 + 3z1z2 − z1 − 2 = 0 ≡
za2 = z1 ∗ z1, za1 = za2 ∗ z2
zb1 = z1 ∗ z2
ze1 = 4za1 + 3zb1 , zf1 = z1 + 2, ze1 = zf1
(6)
Since inequalities have to be captured through equalities with non-negative variables, the in-
equalities of (4) have to be transformed as follows:
∀j ∈ [n], zj = slj + Lj , zj + suj = Uj , zj , slj , suj ≥ 0 (7)
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Let R(F ) be a reformulation of F , using transformation similar to (6) for each fi, and that of
(7) for each inequality. All the variables in R(F ) are constrained to be non-negative.
In order to construct R(F ) from F , we need to introduce many auxiliary variables (as was done
in (6)). Let the number of variables in R(F ) be N , and out of these let z1, . . . , zn be the original
set of variables of F (4). Given a system R(F ) of equalities, we will construct an exchange market
M, such that value of each variable zj , j ∈ [N ] is captured as price pj of good Gj in M. Further,
we make sure that these prices satisfy all the relations in R(F ) at every equilibrium of M.
4.2 Ensuring scale invariance
Since equilibrium prices of an exchange market are scale invariant, the relations that these prices
satisfy have to be scale invariant too. However note that in (5) (LIN.) and (QD.) are not scale
invariant. To handle this we introduce a special good Gs, such that when its price ps is set to 1 we
get back the original system.
(EQ.) pa = pb
(LIN.) pa = Bpb + Cpc +Dps, where B,C,D ≥ 0
(QD.) pa =
pb∗pc
ps
(8)
Let R′(F ) be a system of equalities after applying the transformation of (8) to R(F ). Note that,
R′(F ) has exactly one extra variable than R(F ), namely ps, and solutions of R′(F ) with ps = 1 are
exactly the solutions of R(F ).
Let the size of R′(F ) be (# variables + # relations in R′(F ) + size(B,C,D) in each of (LIN.)-
type relations). Recall that Mfi denotes the set of monomials in polynomial fi. To bound the
values at a solution of R′(F ), define
H = MmaxU
d
max + 1, where
d = maxfi deg(fi), Mmax = maxi |Mfi |,
Umax = max{maxj Uj , max
fi, (α,d) ∈Mfi
|α|}.
Lemma 4.2 size[R′(F )] = poly(size[F ]). Vector p is a non-negative solution of R′(F ) with ps = 1
iff zj = pj , ∀j ∈ [n] is a solution of F . Further, pj ≤ H, ∀j ∈ [N ].
Proof : For the first part, it is enough to bound size[R(F )]. Note that the number of auxiliary
variables added to R(F ) to construct a monomial of fi is at most its degree. Further, to construct
the expression of fi from these, the extra variables needed is at most the number of monomials.
Further, the coefficients of (LIN.) type relations are coefficients of the monomials of fi’s. Thus,
we get that size[R′(F )] = O(
∑
i∈[m] deg(fi)
2size[fi] +
∑
j∈[n] size(Uj) + size(Lj)) = poly(size[F ]).
The second part follows by construction. For the third part note that (p1, . . . , pN ) is a solution
of R(F ). Since variables of the original system F is upper bounded by Ujs, it is easy to see that
the maximum value of any variable in a non-negative solution of R(F ) is at most H. 2
Next we construct a market whose equilibria satisfy all the relations of R′(F ), and has ps > 0.
4.3 Market construction
In this section we construct marketM consisting of goods G1, . . . , GN and Gs, such that the prices
p1, . . . , pN and ps, satisfy all the relations of R
′(F ) at equilibrium.
First we want price of Gs to be always non-zero at equilibrium. To ensure this we add the
following agent to market M. Recall that Wij is the amount of good Gj agent Ai brings to the
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market, Ui : Rg+ → R+ is the utility function of Ai, and xi denotes the bundle of goods consumed
by her.
As : Wss = 1, Wsj = 0, ∀j ∈ [N ]; Us(xs) = xss (9)
Lemma 4.3 At every equilibrium of market M, we have ps > 0, and xss = Wss.
Proof : At an equilibrium if ps = 0, then agent As will demand infinite amount of good s, a
contradiction. The second part follows using the fact that at any given prices, As wants to buy
only good s, and has exactly Wssps amount of money to spend. 2
Since a price pj may be used in multiple relations of R
′(F ), the corresponding good has to be
used in many different gadgets. When we combine all these gadgets to form marketM, the biggest
challenge is to analyze the flow of goods among these gadgets at equilibrium. We overcome this all
together by forming closed submarket for each gadget.
Definition 4.4 (submarket) A submarket M˜ of a market M consists of a subset of agents and
goods such that the endowment and utility functions of agents in M˜ and the production functions
of firms in M˜ are defined over goods only in M˜.
Definition 4.5 (closed submarket) A submarket M˜ of a market M is said to be closed if at
every equilibrium of the entire market M, the submarket M˜ is locally at equilibrium, i.e., its total
demand equals its total supply. The total demand of M˜ is the sum of demands of agents in M˜ and
its total supply is the sum of initial endowments of agents in M˜.
In other words, M˜ does not interfere with the rest of market in terms of supply and demand,
even if some goods in M˜ are used outside as well. Note that the market of (9) is a closed submarket
(due to Lemma 4.3) with only one agent and one good, namely As and Gs respectively. We will
see that the submarket M˜ establishing a relation of type (EQ.), (LIN.) and (QD.) has a set
of exclusive goods used only in M˜, in order to achieve the closed property. Before describing
construction of closed submarkets for more involved relations, we first describe it for a simple
and important equality relation. Furthermore, we will use equality to construct closed markets for
(QD.).
Let there be K relations in R′(F ), numbered from 1 to K, and let Mr denote the closed
submarket establishing relation r ∈ [K].
4.3.1 Submarket for relation (EQ.) pa = pb
The gadget for (EQ.) consists of two agents with Leontief utility functions, as given in Table 1,
where good Gr is exclusive to this submarket.
MEQ: 2 Agents (A1, A2) and 3 Goods (Ga, Gb, Gr) // Gr: an exclusive good
A1: W1 = (0, 1, 1) and U1(x) = min{xa, xr}
A2: W2 = (1, 0, 1) and U2(x) = min{xb, xr}
Table 1: Closed submarket Mr for rth relation pa = pb
In Mr, the endowment vector Wi’s should be interpreted as (amount of Ga, amount of Gb,
amount of Gr), i.e., in the same order of goods as listed on the first line of the table; we use similar
representation in the subsequent constructions.
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Lemma 4.6 Consider the market Mr of Table 1.
• Mr is a closed submarket.
• At equilibrium, Mr enforces pa = pb.
• Every non-negative solution of pa = pb gives an equilibrium of Mr.
Proof : Let α and β denote the utility obtained by A1 and A2 at equilibrium respectively. Then
using (1) which characterizes optimal bundles for Leontief functions, the market clearing conditions
of the two agents give:
pb + pr = α(pa + pr)
pa + pr = β(pb + pr)
Clearly the above conditions imply that αβ = 1 ⇒ β = 1/α. Note that A1 and A2 consume α
and β amounts of good Gr respectively. And since this good is exclusive toMr, no other agent will
consume it. Further, there are exactly two units of Gr available in the entire marketM. Hence we
get,
α+ β ≤ 2
Replacing β = 1α in the above condition gives (α−1)2 ≤ 0⇒ α = β = 1. Therefore, we get that
every equilibrium of Mr enforces pa + pr = pb + pr ⇒ pa = pb. Further, Mr is a closed submarket
because at equilibrium, demand of every good in Mr is equal to its supply in Mr even though
every good except Gr might participate in the rest of the market as well.
For the last part, if pa = pb ≥ 0, then choosing pr = 1, and x1a = x1r = x2b = x2r = 1 gives a
market equilibrium of Mr. 2
4.3.2 Submarket for relation (LIN.) pa = Bpb + Cpc +Dps
The gadget for (LIN.) is an extension of (EQ.) having two agents with Leontief utility functions,
as given in Table 2, where B,C,D ≥ 0.
Remark 4.7 For simplicity, we denote agents of each submarket by A1, A2, · · · , and sometimes
exclusive goods by G1, G2, · · · , however they are different across submarkets.
Mr: 2 Agents (A1, A2) and 5 Goods (Ga, Gb, Gc, Gs, Gr) // Gr: an exclusive good
A1: W1 = (1, 0, 0, 0, 1) and U1(x) = min{xbB , xcC , xsD , xr}
A2: W2 = (0, B,C,D, 1) and U2(x) = min{xa, xr}
Table 2: Mr: Closed market for rth relation pa = Bpb + Cpc +Dps, B, C,D ≥ 0
Lemma 4.8 Consider the market Mr of Table 2 with B,C,D ≥ 0.
• Mr is a closed submarket.
• At equilibrium, Mr enforces pa = Bpb + Cpc +Dps.
• Every non-negative solution of pa = Bpb + Cpc +Dps gives an equilibrium of Mr.
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Proof : The proof is similar to that of Lemma 4.6. Let α and β denote the utility obtained by
A1 and A2 at equilibrium respectively. Then using (1) together with market clearing conditions of
the two agents, we get:
pa + pr = α(Bpb + Cpc +Dps + pr)
Bpb + Cpc +Dps + pr = β(pa + pr)
Clearly the above conditions imply αβ = 1 ⇒ β = 1/α. Since Gr is exclusive to this market,
using similar argument as the proof of Lemma 4.6 we get that α + β ≤ 2. This together with
β = 1/α gives α = β = 1. Thus every equilibrium ofMr enforces pa+pr = Bpb+Cpc+Dps+pr ⇒
pa = Bpb + Cpc +Dps. Hence, Mr is a closed submarket.
For the last part, if pa = BpB + Cpc +Dps ≥ 0, then setting pr = 1, x1r = x2r = x2a = 1, and
x1b = B, x1,c = C, x1s = D gives a market equilibrium of Mr. 2
Using Lemma 4.8, we easily get the following.
Corollary 4.9 There is a simple closed submarket to establish any linear relation of form pa =
E1pb1 + · · ·+Enpbn +E0ps for any n ≥ 1, where E0, E1, . . . , En are non-negative rational constants.
4.3.3 Submarket for relation (QD.) pa =
pbpc
ps
In this section, we derive a closed submarket for establishing the (QD.) relation. In order to simplify
the market construction, which is quite involved, we first make the following two assumptions, which
are removed later. First, that ps = 1 and second, that pb 6= 0. The first assumption violates the
scale invariance of prices, see Section 4.2, but simplifies the relation needed to pa = pbpc. The
second assumption ensures that no agent can demand an infinite amount of a good of price pb
(Note that in the reduction, since the price of a good corresponds to the probability of playing a
certain strategy, eventually we do need to allow for pb = 0.).
The main idea for enforcing the simpler relation, pa = pbpc, is to ensure that there is an agent
A whose initial endowment is one unit of Good 1 priced at pa, and she desires to consume only
Good 2 priced at pb. The left over amount of Good 2 after everyone, except agent A, consume is
exactly pc. Since pb > 0, agent A has to buy all of this left over amount which requires her to spend
pbpc. On the other hand her earning from the sell of Good 1 is pa, implying pa = pbpc. Figure
1 illustrates the idea. The difficulty in implementing this idea lies in the fact that pb and pc are
variables; if they were both constants, the construction of the submarket would have been easy.
A
(pb, pc) (1, pbpc)
2 1
w1 = 1
pa = p1
Figure 1: The main idea for enforcing the relation pa = pbpc. Wires are numbered in circle, and wire i
carries good Gi. The tuple on each wire represents (amount, price).
In order to present the submarket in a modular manner, we will first define some devices.
Each of these devices will be implemented via a set of agents with Leontief utility functions. Each
device ensures a certain relationship between the net endowment left over by these agents and the
net consumption of these agents; for convenience, we will call these the net endowment and net
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consumption of the device. Clearly, at equilibrium prices, for each device, the total worth of its net
endowment and net consumption must be equal.
Submarkets for the devices
In this section, we show implementation of three devices to be used in the submarket for (QD.)
relation.
Converter (Conv(q)): The net consumption of this device is one unit of good G1, whose price
is p, and the net endowment is p/q units of good G2, whose price is q. Table 3 and Figure 2 illustrate
the implementation. In the figure tuple on edges represent (amount, price) of the corresponding
good shown in circle. Table 3 has two parts: Part 1 describes the market and Part 2 enforces linear
relations among prices using the submarkets described in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.
Conv(q)
(1, p)
(pq , q)
A1 A2
(1, p)
(pq , q)
(1, Hq − p)
(H − pq , q)
1 : 1
3
2
2
1
w12 = H
Figure 2: Flow of goods in Part 1 of Table 3 for Conv(q). Wires are numbered in circle, and wire i carries
good Gi. The tuple on each wire represents (amount, price).
Part 1:
Input: 1 unit of G1 at price p
Output: p/q units of G2 at price q
2 Agents (A1, A2), 3 goods (G1, G2, G3)
A1: W12 = H and U1(x) = min{x1, x3}
A2: W23 = 1 and U2(x) = x2
Part 2:
Closed submarkets for the following linear relations
p2 = q
p3 = Hq − p
Table 3: A closed submarket for Conv(q)
There are two agents A1 and A2, and three goods G1, G2 and G3. The endowment of A1 is H
units of G2, whose price is set to q. Recall that H is a constant defined in Section 4.2. A1 likes to
consume G1 and G3 in the ratio of 1:1. The net consumption of this device, i.e., one unit of G1 at
price p, is consumed by A1. Agent A2’s endowment is one unit of G3, whose price is set to Hq− p.
A2 wants to consume G2, whose price is q. Hence, it consumes H − p/q units of G2 (observe that
there is no need to perform the division involved in p/q explicitly). The remaining p/q units of G2
form the net endowment of the device, as required.
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Combiner (Comb(l, pa, pb)): The net consumption of this device is l units each of goods G1
and G2, whose prices are pa and pb, respectively. The net endowment is l units of a good G3, whose
price is pa + pb. Table 4 and Figure 3 illustrate the implementation.
(1, l(pa + pb))
(l, pb)(l, pa)
21
4
1 : 1
A3
A1
Comb(l, pa, pb)
w23 = H
(1, Hpa +Hpb − p4)
(H − l, pa + pb)
5
3
(l, pa + pb)3
A2
1 : 1
Comb(l, pa, pb)
(l, pa + pb)3
(l, pa)
1
(l, pb)
2
Figure 3: Flow of goods in Part 1 of Table 4 for Comb(l, pa, pb). Wires are numbered, and wire i carries
good Gi. The tuple on each wire represents (amount, price).
Part 1:
Input: l units of G1 and G2 at price pa and pb respectively
Output: l units of G3 at price pa + pb
3 Agents (A1, A2, A3), 5 goods (G1, G2, G3, G4, G5)
A1: W14 = 1 and U1(x) = min{x1, x2}
A2: W23 = H and U2(x) = min{x4, x5}
A3: W35 = 1 and U2(x) = x3
Part 2:
Closed submarkets for the following linear relations
p3 = pa + pb
p5 = Hpa +Hpb − p4
Table 4: A closed submarket for Comb(l, pa, pb)
Agent A1 wants G1 and G2 in the ratio 1:1, and no other agent wants these goods. Therefore,
A1 will consume all of the available G1 and G2 and hence the price of her endowment, i.e., one unit
of G4, will be l(pa + pb) (observe that there is a multiplication involved in this price; however, it is
not performed explicitly).
Agent A2 wants G4 and G5 in the ratio 1:1. The price of A3’s endowment, i.e., one unit of G5
is set to H(pa + pb)− p4. Hence the endowment of A2, i.e., H units of G3, has a price of (pa + pb).
Of this, A3 must consume (H − l), leaving l amount of G3 as the net endowment of this device.
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Splitter (Spl(l, pa, pb)): The net endowment of this device is l units each of two goods G2
and G3, whose prices are pa and pb, respectively. The net consumption is l units of Good 1, whose
price is pa + pb. Table 5 and Figure 5 illustrate the implementation.
(H − l, pa)
(H − l, pb)
(1, Hpa +Hpb − p4)
(1, l(pa + pb))
(l, pa + pb)
(l, pb)(l, pa)
3
2
5
32
1
4
1 : 1
1 : 1
A2
A1
A3
Spl(l, pa, pb)
w22 = w23 = H
Spl(l, pa, pb)
(l, pb)
3
(l, pa)
2
(l, pa + pb)1
Figure 4: Flow of goods in Part 1 of Table 5 for Spl(l, pa, pb). Wires are numbered, and wire i carries good
Gi. The tuple on each wire represents (amount, price).
Good G1 is desired only by Agent A1. Hence, the price of her initial endowment, i.e., one unit of
G4, is forced to be l(pa+pb) (observe that the multiplication involved is not done explicitly). Agent
A2 wants goods G4 and G5 in the ratio 1:1. The price of G5 is set explicitly to H(pa + pb) − p4.
The endowment of A2 is H units each of G2 and G3, whose prices have been set to pa and pb,
respectively. Agent A3 wants these two goods in the ratio 1:1, and because of the setting of the
price of her initial endowment, she must consume (H − l) units of each of these two goods. The
remaining amounts, i.e., l each, form the net endowment of the device, as required.
Part 1:
Input: l units of G1 at price pa + pb
Output: l units of G2 and G3 at price pa and pb respectively
3 Agents (A1, A2, A3), 5 goods (G1, G2, G3, G4, G5)
A1: W14 = 1 and U1(x) = x1
A2: W22 = W23 = H and U2(x) = min{x4, x5}
A3: W35 = 1 and U2(x) = min{x2, x3}
Part 2:
Closed submarkets for the following linear relation
p2 = pa
p3 = pb
p5 = Hpa +Hpb − p4
Table 5: A closed submarket for Spl(l, pa, pb)
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Submarket construction for pa = pbpc
Now we are ready to describe a closed submarket that enforces pa = pbpc. Consider the sub-
market given in Table 6. In this market, the 7 goods, G1, . . . G7 are exclusive to the submarket;
the price of good Gj is pj . The prices of G1, G2, G4, G5, G6, G7 are set to appropriate using (EQ.)
and (LIN.) relations and prices pa, pb and pc, as specified in the second part of the table. The
submarket uses two Converters, one Combiner and one Splitter. Each of these devices is specified
by giving its (net endowment, net consumption). Besides the agents needed to implement these
devices, the submarket requires two additional agents, A1 and A2.
Part 1:
2 Agents (A1, A2), 2 Converters (Conv1, Conv2), 1 Combiner (Comb),
1 Splitter (Spl), and 7 Goods (G1, . . . , G7)
A1: W12 = 1 and U1(x) = x1
A2: W26 = 1 and U2(x) = x5
Conv1 = Conv(1): (G1, G2)
Conv2 = Conv(pb): (G6, G7)
Comb(pc, pb, 1): ((G2, G7), G3)
Spl(pc, pb, 1): (G3, (G4, G5))
Part 2:
Closed submarkets for the following linear relations
p1 = pc
p2 = 1
p4 = 1
p5 = pb
p6 = pa
p7 = pb
Table 6: A closed submarket M′r that enforces pa = pbpc
Lemma 4.10 The submarket given in Table 6 (and illustrated in Figure 5) enforces pa = pbpc and
is closed at equilibrium under the assumption pb 6= 0.
Proof : Let p be an equilibrium price vector of the entire market, where pb > 0. It is easy to see
that prices p2, p4, p5 and p7 are strictly greater than zero, so these have to be consumed completely.
Further, since the (EQ.) and (LIN.) submarkets implementing the second part of Table 6 are
closed (Lemmas 4.6 and 4.8), the net endowment of goods G1, . . . , G7 for agents in this submarket,
including those in devices, is exactly what they bring.
We have set p1 = pc and the endowment of A1 is one unit of G2. Good G1 is desired only by
the first agent in Conv1; hence its net consumption costs pc. Furthermore, since the price of G2 is
set to 1 and the parameter of Conv1 is 1, the net endowment of Conv1 will be pc units of G2.
The first agent in Comb wants G2 and G7 in the ratio 1:1 both of whose prices are positive.
Moreover, net endowment pc of Good G2 is desired only by this agent, and therefore using (1) at
equilibrium the agent has to consume pc units of both the goods. Since prices of G2 and G7 are 1
and pb respectively, the price of the net endowment of Comb will be pb + 1, and the amount will
be pc.
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(pc, 1)
(1, pc)
(pc, 1) (pc, pb)
(1, pbpc)(pc, pb + 1)
(pc, pb)
A1
Conv(1)
A2Spl(pc, pb, 1)
Comb(pc, pb, 1)
4 5
6
7
3
2
1
Conv(pb)
Figure 5: Flow of goods in Part 1 of Table 6. Wires are numbered, and wire i carries good ri. The tuple
on each wire represents (amount, price).
Thus, output of Comb is pc amount of good G3 priced at pb + 1, which has to be consumed by
Spl. The prices p4 and p5 are set to 1 and pb, respectively, thereby ensuring that the total worth
of the net endowment and net consumption of Spl are equal. Finally, agent A2 gets pc amount
of G5 whose price is pb and has one unit of G6 as her endowment. Hence the price of G6 must
be p6 = pa = pbpc, as required. Good G6 is only desired by the first agent in Conv2. The net
endowment of this device is pc units of G7 whose price is set to pb, and this good is fully consumed
by the first agent of Comb.
Note that it may be possible that pc is zero which may force prices of some of G1, . . . , G7 goods
to be zero, like G1. However, whoever consumes this good also want to consume another good with
non-zero price, in the same proportion. And therefore demand of no good will exceed the supply.
Since the total supply and demand of each of the seven goods are equal, the submarket is closed
at these (equilibrium) prices. 2
Now we will modify the construction of Table 6 in order to remove the assumption pb > 0 and
ps = 1. Consider the implementation of Table 7.
Lemma 4.11 Consider the submarket Mr of Table 7,
• Mr is a closed submarket.
• At equilibrium, Mr enforces pa = pbpcps , and pc/ps ≤ H.
• Every non-negative solution of pa = pbpc, where ps > 0 and pc ≤ H, gives an equilibrium of
Mr with ps = 1.
Proof : The only difference between the market of Tables 7 and 6 are that pb is replaced with
pb + ps, and pc with pc/ps. As ps > 0 (Lemma 4.3) we have that pb + ps > 0, and
pc
ps
is well-defined.
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Part 1:
2 Agents (A1, A2), 2 Converters (Conv1, Conv2), 1 Combiner (Comb),
1 Splitter (Spl), and 7 Goods (G1, . . . , G7)
A1: W12 = 1 and U1(x) = x1
A2: W26 = 1 and U2(x) = x5
Conv1 = Conv(ps): (G1, G2)
Conv2 = Conv(pb + ps): (G6, G7)
Comb(pc/ps, pb + ps, ps): ((G2, G7), G3)
Spl(pc/ps, pb + ps, ps): (G3, (G4, G5))
Part 2:
Closed submarkets for the following linear relations
p1 = pc
p2 = ps
p4 = ps
p5 = pb + ps
p7 = pb + ps
pa + pc = p6
Table 7: A closed submarket Mr that enforces pa = pbpcps
Further, the prices to be set in Part 2 of devices are still linear, even when l = pc/ps in Comb and
Spl. Thus using Lemma 4.10 it follows that the market is closed and p6 = (pb + ps)
pc
ps
, Then using
the last linear relation enforced in Part 2 of Table 7 we get pa =
pbpc
ps
.
For the last part, consider a non-negative pa, pb and pc such that pa = pbpc. Set ps = 1, the
prices of goods G1, G2, G4, G5, G7 as per Part 2 of Table 7, and p3 = pb + 2ps and p6 = (pb + ps)
pc
ps
.
For goods within devices, set their prices as per Part 2 of Tables 3, 4 and 5 respectively. For good
G4 in Comb(
pc
ps
) and good G4 in Spl(
pc
ps
), set their prices to to (pb + 2ps) ∗ pcps . It is easy to verify
that this gives an equilibrium for market Mr of Table 7. 2
4.4 Results
In this section we prove the main results using the claims established in Section 4.3. Given a system
F of multivariate polynomials as in (4), construct an equivalent set of relations R′(F ) consisting
of only three types of basic relations given in (8). Let K be the number of relations in R′(F ). For
each relation r ∈ [K], depending on its type, we construct a market Mr as described in Tables 1,
2 and 7. Further, for each r of type (QD.) replace the corresponding devices with agents of Tables
3, 4 and 5 respectively. Combine all theMr’s to form one marketM. Also add the agent of (9) in
M.
Since equilibrium prices of an Arrow-Debreu market are scale invariant, i.e., if p = (p1, . . . , pg)
is an equilibrium price vector then so is αp, ∀α > 0, it is without loss of generality (wlog) to
assume some kind of normalization. For example,
∑
j pj = 1, or choose a good to be nume`raire,
i.e., fix its price to 1.5 For the latter case, we require price of the nume`raire good to be non-zero
5We note that, the reduction in [16] from fixed-point to Arrow-Debreu market with algebraic excess demand
function, it is assumed that
∑
j pj = 1 at equilibrium.
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at equilibrium, and any good, for which an agent is non-satiated6, qualifies.
Given an equilibrium price vector p ofM, we know that ps > 0 due to Lemma 4.3. Henceforth
by equilibrium prices p of M w.l.o.g. we mean equilibrium prices with ps = 1. In the next two
lemmas we establish that the equilibria of market M exactly capture the solutions of system F .
Lemma 4.12 If p is an equilibrium price vector of M, then zj = pj ,∀j ∈ [n] is a solution of F .
Proof : Due to Lemma 4.2, it is enough to show that p is a solution of R′(F ). The submarket
Mr, constructed for relation r of R′(F ), is closed and enforces r at p (first two statements of
Lemmas 4.6, 4.8, and 4.11). Since M is a union of Mr’s, p has to satisfy each of the relation of
R′(F ). 2
Next we map solutions of F to equilibria of market M.
Lemma 4.13 If z is a solution of F , then there exists equilibrium prices p of market M, where
ps = 1 and pj = zj , ∀j ∈ [n].
Proof : Using Lemma 4.2, we can construct a non-negative solution p′ of R′(F ) using z such
that p′s = 1, p′j = zj , ∀j ∈ [n], and p′j ≤ H,∀j ∈ [N ].
Construct prices p of market M, where set pj = p′j , ∀j ∈ [N ] and ps = 1. Set xss = 1 for
agent As of (9). Last statement of Lemmas 4.6, 4.8, and 4.11, imply that in each Mr, p can be
extended to yield an equilibrium. Since equilibrium in M consists of equilibrium in each Mr with
same prices for common goods, combining these gives an equilibrium of M. 2
Thus establishing the strong relation between solutions of F and equilibria of market M, next
we prove the main theorem of the paper which will give all the desired hardness results as corollaries.
Theorem 4.14 Equilibrium prices of market M, projected onto (p1, . . . , pn), are in one-to-one
correspondence with the solutions of F . Further M can be expressed using polynomially many bits
in the size[F ], i.e., size[M] = poly(size[F ]).
Proof : First part follows using Lemmas 4.12 and 4.13. For the second part, it is enough to
show that size[M] = poly(size[R′(F )]), due to Lemma 4.2. Let L be the size of R′(F ).
For each of the relation r ∈ [K] of system R′(F ), we add O(1) agents and goods in Mr, as
described in Tables 1, 2, and 7 together with Tables 3, 4 and 5. Let ng and na be the #goods and
#agents in M, then we have ng = O(K) and na = O(K).
Clearly, each agent ofMr brings O(1) goods and has utility for exactly those many goods, and
these markets are closed submarkets (see Definition 4.5). The utility functions of the agents are
Leontief which can be written as (good id, coefficient). The endowments can be captured similarly.
Thus the encoding of endowments and utility functions of agents in Mr requires: (i) O(logK)
if r is of type (EQ.), (ii) O(logK + size(B,C,D)) if r is of type (LIN.), and (iii) O(logK+L) if
r is of type (QD.) as size[H] = O(L), where H is a constant defined in Section 4.2.
Since M is a union of Mr,∀r ∈ [K], and the agent of (9), the size of M is at most O(KL). 2
Theorem 4.14 shows that finding solutions of F can be reduced to finding equilibria of an
exchange market with Leontief utility functions.
6An agent is said to be non-satiated for good j if at any given bundle she can obtain more utility by consuming
additional amount of good j.
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As discussed in Section 3, the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium of a 3-player game
A can be formulated as finding a solution of system FNE(A) (3) of multivariate polynomials in
which variables are bounded between [0, 1] (Lemma 3.2). Note that size[FNE(A)] = O(size(A)).
Further, since taking projection on a set of coordinates is a linear function, the next theorem follows
using the formulation of (3), together with Lemma 3.2, and Theorems 3.3 and 4.14 (see Section 3.1
for the reduction requirements for class FIXP).
Theorem 4.15 Computing an equilibrium of an exchange market with Leontief utility functions
is FIXP-hard. In particular, the corresponding Decision, (Strong) Approximation, and Partial
Computation problems are hard for FIXPd, FIXPa and FIXPpc, respectively.
Further since the class of Leontief utility functions is a special subclass of piecewise-linear
concave (PLC) utility functions, under which goods need not be only complementary (like Leontief)
and substitute (like separable PLC), but can be arbitrary combination of these and much more,
the next theorem follows.
Theorem 4.16 Computing equilibrium of an exchange market with piecewise-linear concave utility
functions is FIXP-hard. In particular, the corresponding Decision, (Strong) Approximation, and
Partial Computation problems are hard for FIXPd, FIXPa and FIXPpc, respectively.
Note that in Theorems 4.15 and 4.16 the resulting market is guaranteed to have an equilibrium,
since it was constructed from an instance of 3-Nash which always has a NE (Nash’s theorem [26]).
However in general an AD market may not have an equilibrium. Checking if an arbitrary exchange
market with SPLC utility function has an equilibrium is known to be NP-complete [33]. We study
the analogous question for Leontief (and in turn PLC) markets. It turns out that the complexity
of these questions is captured by the class ETR.
Theorem 3.5 shows that checking if a 3-player game A has NE within 0.5-ball at origin in l∞
norm is ETR-complete. Clearly, this problem can be reduced to finding a solution of FNE(A) of
(3) with upper-bound on zps’s changed from 1 to 0.5 (Lemma 3.2). If this system is reduced to a
market M, then M will have an equilibrium if and only if game A has a NE within 0.5-ball at
origin (Theorem 4.14). Thus we get the following result.
Theorem 4.17 Checking existence of an equilibrium in an exchange market with Leontief utility
functions, and in market with PLC utility functions is ETR-hard.
[18] gave a reduction from an exchange market M with arbitrary concave utility functions to
an equivalent Arrow-Debreu market M′ with firms, where utility functions of all the agents are
linear. It turns out that M′ has all the goods of M, in addition to others, and equilibrium prices
ofM are in one-to-one correspondence with the equilibrium prices ofM′ projected onto the prices
of common goods. Further the production functions ofM′ are precisely the utility functions inM,
hence representation of M′ is in the order of the representation of M. Therefore, this reduction
together with Theorems 4.15 and 4.17, gives the next two results.
Corollary 4.18 Computing equilibrium of an Arrow-Debreu market with linear utility functions
and Leontief production, and in turn PLC (polyhedral) production sets, is FIXP-hard. In particular,
the corresponding Decision, (Strong) Approximation, and Partial Computation problems are hard
respectively for FIXPd, FIXPa and FIXPpc.
Corollary 4.19 Checking existence of an equilibrium in an Arrow-Debreu market with linear utility
functions and Leontief production, and in turn PLC (polyhedral) production sets, is ETR-hard.
Next we show that checking existence of an equilibrium in markets with PLC utility functions
and PLC production sets is in ETR.
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5 Existence of Equilibrium in ETR
Using the nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP) formulation of [17] to capture equilibria of
PLC markets, in this section we show that checking for existence of equilibrium in PLC markets is
in ETR, and therefore ETR-complete using Corollary 4.19. For the sake of completeness next we
present the NCP formulation derived in [17].
Recall the PLC utility functions and PLC production sets defined in Sections 2.1 and 2.2
respectively. Using the optimal bundle and optimal production plan conditions at equilibrium for
such a market, [17] derived the nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP) formulation AD-NCP
for market equilibrium as shown in Table 8, and showed the Lemma 5.1. All the variables in the
NCP of Table 8 are non-negative, and we omit this condition for the sake of brevity.
Table 8: AD-NCP
∀(f, k) :
∑
j
Dkfjx
s
fj ≤
∑
j
Ckfjx
r
fj + T
k
f and δ
k
f (
∑
j
Dkfjx
s
fj −
∑
j
Ckfjx
r
fj − T kf ) = 0
∀(f, j) : pj ≤
∑
k
Dkfjδ
k
f and x
s
fj(pj −
∑
k
Dkfjδ
k
f ) = 0
∀(f, j) :
∑
k
Ckfjδ
k
f ≤ pj and xrfj(
∑
k
Ckfjδ
k
f − pj) = 0
∀(i, j) :
∑
k
Ukijγ
k
i ≤ λipj and xij(
∑
l
Ukijγ
k
i − λipj) = 0
∀(i, k) : ui ≤
∑
j
Ukijxij + T
k
i and γ
k
i (ui −
∑
j
Ukijxij − T ki ) = 0
∀i :
∑
j
xijpj ≤
∑
j
Wijpj +
∑
f
Θifφf and λi(
∑
j
xijpj −
∑
j
Wijpj −
∑
f
Θifφf ) = 0
∀j :
∑
i
xij +
∑
f
xrfj ≤ 1 +
∑
f
xsfj and pj(
∑
i
xij +
∑
f
xrfj − 1−
∑
f
xsfj) = 0
∀i :
∑
k
γki = 1 and ui = λi(
∑
j
Wijpj +
∑
f
Θifφf ) +
∑
k
γki T
k
i
∀f : φf =
∑
k
δkfT
k
f and
∑
j
pj = 1
Lemma 5.1 [17] If (p,x,xs,xr,λ,γ, δ) is a solution of AD-NCP, then (p,x,xs,xr) is a market
equilibrium. Further, if (p,x,xs,xr) is a market equilibrium, then ∃(λ,γ, δ) such that (p,x,xs,xr,
λ,γ, δ) is a solution of AD-NCP.
Due to Lemma 5.1, checking if the market has an equilibrium is equivalent to checking if AD-
NCP admits a solution. Since all the inequalities and equalities in AD-NCP are polynomial, and
all the coefficients in these polynomials are rational numbers, AD-NCP can be represented using
signature {0, 1,−1,+, ∗, <,≤,=}. The denominators of the coefficients can be removed by taking
least common multiple (LCM) while keeping the size of coefficients polynomial in the original size.
Therefore, checking if AD-NCP has a solution can be formulated in ETR (see Section 3.2 for
definition), and we get the following result using Theorem 4.17.
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Theorem 5.2 Checking existence of an equilibrium in an exchange market with piecewise linear
concave utility functions is ETR-complete.
The next result follows using Corollary 4.19.
Theorem 5.3 Checking existence of an equilibrium in an Arrow-Debreu market with PLC utility
functions and PLC (polyhedral) production sets is ETR-complete.
6 Discussion
Is computing an equilibrium for a Fisher market under PLC utilities FIXP-hard? Clearly the
problem is in FIXP since Fisher markets are a subcase of Arrow-Debreu markets. We believe
that existing techniques, for example of [33] establishing hardness for Fisher markets under SPLC
utilities via reduction from Arrow-Debreu markets, will not work and new ideas are needed. As
stated in Section 1.1, finding an approximate equilibrium under CES utilities was also shown to be
PPAD-complete [6]. Is computing an exact equilibrium FIXP-complete?
In economics, uniqueness of equilibria plays an important role. In this vein, we ask what is the
complexity of deciding if a PLC or Leontief market has more than one equilibria. We note that the
reduction given in this paper blows up the number of equilibria and hence it will not answer this
question in a straightforward manner.
Acknowledgement: We wish to thank Mihalis Yannakakis for valuable discussions.
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